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Effective Written Advocacy
Before generalist Judges:
Advice From recent Decisions
By Douglas E. Abrams
“The Law is Made by the Bar”
 “The best job I ever had.”1 That is how retired Congress-
man, federal circuit judge, and White House Counsel Abner 
J. Mikva remembers the judicial clerkship that began his 
career 60 years ago. 
 Fresh out of law school and eager to make their mark, 
clerks are fortunate indeed for the opportunity to learn from 
a judge with knowledge drawn from years of experience. 
But clerks are equally fortunate to learn how much judges 
in our adversary system of justice do not know. Recogniz-
ing the limits of one’s knowledge is key to success in any 
professional pursuit, so lessons in these limits are perhaps 
the most valuable mentoring of all for clerks destined to 
spend their careers at the bar.
 From the commencement of a civil or criminal case, the 
limits of the judge’s knowledge reach both facts and law. 
Judges receiving papers typically lack the familiarity with 
the case that the lawyers may enjoy from having lived with 
it before filing. Time spent interviewing clients and wit-
nesses, researching and writing the pleadings, and engaging 
in other pretrial give-and-take provides counsel a head start 
on fact finding before the judge enters the picture. 
 Judges in general jurisdiction courts also may not ini-
tially be as familiar as counsel with the substantive law that 
will decide the case. As American law has grown increas-
ingly intricate and diverse in recent decades, more and 
more lawyers have opted for specialty practices.2 Special-
ization means that judges may come from private or public 
sector careers that exposed them regularly to only some of 
the substantive law that now fills their dockets. Relatively 
few lawyers practice civil and criminal law simultaneously, 
and intricate administrative rules and regulations often cre-
ate doctrine most familiar to specialists. 
 With these institutional constraints grounded in experi-
ence and the complex legal fabric, says the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the 7th Circuit, “courts rely on lawyers to iden-
tify the pertinent facts and law.”3 Because trial and appellate 
courts often severely limit oral argument or eliminate it 
altogether, identification and persuasion may depend heav-
ily or entirely on counsel’s written submissions.
 The reliance cited by the 7th Circuit is a national tradi-
tion that actually predates the recent trend toward spe-
cialized practice. Trial and appellate judges have long 
maintained a “symbiotic”4 relationship with counsel who 
“educate the Court”5 with argument tailored to the judge’s 
circumstances, needs and expectations. “The law is made 
by the Bar, even more than by the Bench,” said then-Judge 
Oliver Wendell Holmes in 1885.6  Justice Louis D. Bran-
deis concurred as he ascended to the Supreme Court bench 
in 1916:  “A judge rarely performs his functions adequately 
unless the case before him is adequately presented.”7  Jus-
tice Felix Frankfurter wrote later that “the judicial process 
[is] at its best” when courts receive “comprehensive briefs 
and powerful arguments on both sides.”8
Two Strategies for Effective Written 
Advocacy
 Treatises capably explore written trial and appellate 
advocacy, and this article makes no effort to duplicate their 
depth.9 In recent reported trial and appellate decisions, 
however, judges themselves highlight two core strategies 
of written advocacy that bear discussion here. First, 
advocates should orient the judge who is a newcomer to 
the case’s facts, and perhaps also its relevant law; and 
second, advocates should avoid jargon best understood 
by specialists, which may initially confound the court and 
frustrate the bond of communication between writer and 
reader.
Orienting the Court
 The judge may not initially be as conversant in the ap-
plicable law as lawyers who have specialized in the field 
for years. “It is unhelpful,” says one district court, “when 
attorneys write briefs that presuppose specialized knowl-
edge on the part of their readers.”10
 The facts too may initially disorient the trial judge who 
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did not pore over drafts of prelimi-
nary papers or attend the depositions, 
and the appellate judges who did 
not preside at the trial or create and 
assemble the record step by step. 
Discussion of the facts – the bedrock 
of most cases, even before applica-
tion of the law – should not assume 
the judge’s familiarity with the case. 
When a brief or other written sub-
mission cites to depositions, the trial 
transcript, or other papers in the re-
cord, advocates serve their cause best 
by explaining the point they mean to 
explain or support.
 Unless the court does its own 
independent review of the facts and 
the law, counsel who fail to provide a 
comprehensible pathway risk for-
feiting the opportunity to persuade, 
and may also risk forfeiting valu-
able time during oral argument with 
avoidable questions from the bench. 
“Dropping a judge in the middle of 
an alien landscape without a map 
and expecting him to get his bear-
ings from fragments of testimony 
couched in occupational jargon to 
which he has not previously been ex-
posed,” explained one federal district 
court, “is not conducive to informed 
decisionmaking.”11
Avoiding Jargon
 “[T]he realm of the conflicts of 
laws,” wrote Dean William J. Prosser 
in 1953, “is a dismal swamp, filled 
with quaking quagmires, and inhab-
ited by learned but eccentric profes-
sors who theorize about mysterious 
matters in strange and incomprehen-
sible jargon.  The ordinary court . . . 
is quite lost when engulfed and en-
tangled in it.”12  Reminders like these 
about the law’s frequent complexity 
remain valuable for 21st Century 
advocates.
 Unadorned jargon may serve a 
legal writer’s purpose, or at least may 
not detract much from it, when the 
audience consists solely of lawyers 
trained in the writer’s specialty. But 
without this foundation of common 
understanding, warns Judge Rich-
ard A. Posner of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the 7th Circuit, “much 
legal jargon can obscure rather than 
illuminate a particular case.”13
 In 2008, in Indiana Lumbermens 
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Reinsurance 
Results, Inc., the 7th Circuit held that 
the parties’ contract did not require 
the plaintiff insurer to pay commis-
sions to the company it had retained 
to review the insurer’s reinsurance 
claims.14  Writing for the panel, Judge 
Posner reported that the parties’ briefs 
“were difficult for us judges to un-
derstand because of the density of the 
reinsurance jargon in them.”15
 “There is nothing wrong with a 
specialized vocabulary – for use by 
specialists,” Judge Posner explained. 
“Federal district and circuit judges, 
however, . . . are generalists. We hear 
very few cases involving reinsurance, 
and cannot possibly achieve expertise 
in reinsurance practices except by the 
happenstance of having practiced in 
that area before becoming a judge, 
as none of us has. Lawyers should un-
derstand the judges’ limited knowl-
edge of specialized fields and choose 
their vocabulary accordingly. Every 
esoteric term used by the reinsurance 
industry has a counterpart in ordinary 
English.”16
 Judge Posner’s commonsense 
advice – to write with an eye for the 
judges’ needs and expectations – is 
not judicial pettiness. In trial and ap-
pellate courts alike, the advice relates 
directly to the client’s best interests, 
but also to the sound administration 
of justice. In an age of swelled dock-
ets and often intricate law, counsel’s 
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unnecessary reliance on jargon forces 
the court to waste valuable time 
demystifying avoidable obscurity. By 
enhancing the risk that the court will 
misapprehend counsel’s key points, 
jargon also enhances the risk that the 
court will “get it wrong.” 
 Counsel in Indiana Lumbermens 
Mutual Insurance Co., Judge Posner 
concluded, “could have saved us 
some work and presented their posi-
tions more effectively had they done 
the translations from reinsurancese 
into everyday English themselves.”17
 In New Medium LLC v. Barco N.V., 
Judge Posner again urged counsel to 
consider the needs of their audience 
before writing.18 Sitting by designa-
tion as a trial judge, he instructed 
the parties that “[a]ll submissions 
must be brief and non-technical and 
eschew patent-law jargon. Since I am 
neither an electrical engineer nor a 
patent lawyer, . . . the parties’ lawyers 
must translate technical and legal 
jargon into ordinary language.”19
 Plain English may warrant coun-
sel’s particular attention when the 
court reviews an agency decision 
because, according to the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the 5th Circuit, veteran 
agency personnel may acquire “in-
sights and experience denied judges. 
The subtleties . . . encased in jargon 
and tucked into interstices of the 
administrative scheme, may escape 
us.”20  “It is the responsibilities of the 
parties to properly educate the court,” 
explains a federal district judge, “not 
of the court to improperly defer to an 
agency decision.”21
Conclusion: Persuading 
and Assisting the Court
 The 5th Circuit may have exagg-
erated when it likened judges 
sometimes to “sophisticated 
uninitiates” when they read or hear 
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adversary argument.22  Advocates 
convey no condescension, however, 
when they write in a respectful 
professional tone using, as one 
federal district court recommends, 
language “intelligible to everyday 
speakers of English.”23
 As “a representative of clients 
[and] an officer of the legal system” 
under the ABA Model Code of 
Professional Conduct,24 advocates 
write with dual goals. “First,” said 
Judge Hugh R. Jones of the New 
York Court of Appeals, “you seek to 
persuade the court of the merit of the 
client’s case, to create an emotional 
empathy for your position. Then you 
assist the court to reach a conclusion 
favorable to the client’s interest in 
terms of the analysis of the law and 
the procedural posture of the case.”25
 Advocates persuade and assist most 
effectively with the familiar quartet 
that marks any legal writing that 
strives to connect with the anticipated 
audience – precision, conciseness, 
simplicity and clarity.26
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Correction
 in the “Missouri legal Trivia” quiz appearing in the Winter 2011 issue of Precedent, Judge nannette 
Baker was incorrectly identified as the first woman to be appointed as a united states Magistrate Judge for 
the eastern District of Missouri. The correct answer should have been Judge Carol e. Jackson, who became 
a united states Magistrate Judge for the eastern District of Missouri in 1986.
 We regret the error and any confusion it may have caused.
